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This Article considers the notable developments in Indiana family law during
the survey period of October 1, 2017 to September 30, 2018. The published
appellate cases surveyed in this Article concern property division upon divorce;
parenting time and visitation; child custody; child support; adoption and
paternity; Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) and the termination of
parental rights; and jurisdiction and procedure.
I. PROPERTY DIVISION
One property division matter arising during the survey period concerned a
retirement account funded prior to a twenty-six year marriage.1 The husband
funded the account with $15,000 in 1987, but did not add to it during the
marriage.2 By the time of the divorce, the account had grown to over $200,000.3
The appellate court remanded after determining that the trial court had abused its
discretion in not considering the economic circumstances of both parties or the
earning ability of the parties when awarding the husband the full account, as
required by Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5.4 
In another case, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the
husband had willfully violated the parties’ marital settlement agreement by
removing the wife from his employee benefit plan.5 However, the appellate court
noted that federal law prevented the trial court from requiring the husband to
reinstate the ex-wife as beneficiary.6 The appellate court remanded for a
determination of an alternative remedy for the wife.7 
In another property settlement matter, at the time of the parties’ divorce, the
husband agreed to be solely responsible for the marital home mortgage until it
was paid off, in lieu of any child support.8 Nine years after the divorce, the trial
court agreed with the husband that he should no longer be responsible for the
mortgage payments, as the parties’ children were no longer minors.9 The
appellate court reversed, noting that while a child support obligation could be
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1. Gish v. Gish, 111 N.E.3d 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
2. Id. at 1036.
3. Id. at 1035. 
4. Id. at 1038-39.
5. McCallister v. McCallister, 105 N.E.3d 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
6. Id. at 1119.
7. Id. at 1119, 1121.
8. Copple v. Swindle, 112 N.E.3d 205, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
9. Id. at 209.
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modified, a property settlement agreement could not.10
Also during the survey period, a wife unsuccessfully sought to repudiate a
settlement agreement because it had not been signed by the parties before being
incorporated into the divorce order.11 The Indiana appellate court upheld the
agreement because signatures were not statutorily required, and both parties had
agreed to a verbal recitation of the property settlement agreement during the
course of the final hearing.12
A final noteworthy property matter regarded the enforceability of a post-
nuptial agreement signed five years into the parties’ nearly forty-five year
marriage, after the parties discussed divorce.13 The trial court found that this
document was not clearly a reconciliation agreement, and therefore lacked
consideration and was unenforceable.14 The appellate court reversed, agreeing
with the husband that the agreement was signed with consideration as a
reconciliation agreement, intended to impact a future dissolution of the
marriage.15
II. PARENTING TIME & VISITATION
Regarding parenting time case law during the survey period, an Indiana
appellate court affirmed a modification of parenting time when the mother had
enrolled the children in numerous activities negatively impacting the father’s
visitation.16 Pursuant to the original visitation agreement, the father had several
evening visitation periods, but less weekend visitation.17 Due to the increase in
extracurricular activities and the father’s relocation, the evening visitation became
impractical and stressful to the child.18 Accordingly, a modification of parenting
time was appropriate.19 The court rejected the mother’s argument that the trial
court could not vacate terms of a previous settlement agreement—this was a
parenting time agreement, not an irreversible property agreement.20 
III. CHILD CUSTODY
One significant custody case that arose during the survey period transferred
permanent physical custody between parents due to a pattern of domestic abuse
against the child.21 Temporary physical custody was initially granted to the father
10. Id. at 211.
11. Sanders v. Sanders, 105 N.E.3d 1102, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
12. Id. at 1107.
13. Buskirk v. Buskirk, 86 N.E.3d 217, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
14. Id. at 221.
15. Id. at 224.
16. Moell v. Moell, 84 N.E.3d 741, 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
17. Id. at 746. 
18. Id. at 745.
19. Id. at 745-46.
20. Id. at 744.
21. Collyear-Bell v. Bell, 105 N.E.3d 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
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after the child appeared at school covered in bruises caused by the mother with
a belt.22 Permanent physical custody was subsequently granted to the father after
the mother admitted to at least three other instances of punishing the child with
a belt.23 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant the father
physical custody of the child, finding that the trial court was within its discretion
to consider the child’s preferences and life adjustments, in addition to the
repeated violence against the child, the latter of which statutorily sufficed to show
substantial change pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21.24
In another case, the appellate court affirmed that a mother’s stroke was a
substantial and continuing change in circumstances supporting a modification of
physical custody to the father.25 The mother suffered permanent severe physical
and verbal disabilities that required her extended family to assist in parenting the
child.26 The mother conceded that this was a substantial and continuing change
in circumstance, but she argued that her ability to parent had not been adversely
affected, despite her inability to assist the child with homework or to effectively
communicate directly with the child.27 Under these circumstances, the appellate
court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in modifying custody
after concluding that the substantial change in circumstance had adversely
affected the mother’s ability to care for the child.28
In a final custody case, prior to the divorce and custody hearing, the mother
accepted a job in Maryland, paid a deposit for the child to attend a private school
in Maryland without consulting the father, moved all of her belongings to
Maryland, and intended to move to Maryland regardless of the court’s decision.29
The trial court granted primary physical custody to the father, finding that the
parents were equally involved in the child’s life and that the child had a close
bond with grandparents and a half-sibling who lived nearby.30 The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that a move to Maryland would place
a substantial hardship on the father, that the mother had not consulted the father
in relation to the school for the child, and that the parents were equally involved
in the child’s life.31
IV. CHILD SUPPORT
The Indiana appellate courts also considered several noteworthy child support
cases during the survey period. In one such case, the father had a child support
22. Id. at 180-81.
23. Id. at 183.
24. Id. at 185-86.
25. Wills v. Gregory, 92 N.E.3d 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). 
26. Id. at 1135.
27. Id. at 1137-38.
28. Id. at 1142.
29. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d 690, 692-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
30. Id. at 693.
31. Id. at 695-96.
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arrearage of nearly $7000 prior to the children’s emancipation.32 The mother filed
a motion for enforcement of child support, which the trial court granted.33
However, the trial court denied the requested interest on the arrearage because the
children were emancipated and the mother had waited five years to attempt to
collect the arrearage.34 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision,
noting that Indiana Code section 24-4.6-1-101 specifies an 8% interest on
judgments, absent an agreement otherwise by the parties.35 
In another child support case, the father sought a modification of his child
support based on a temporary increase in visitation to make up for missed
visitation.36 The court determined that the father could make up the parenting
time, having been previously and wrongfully denied parenting time with the
child, but he had not met the burden of proof to show that custody be changed.37
The court also affirmed that the father could not reduce his child support because
he had already received credit for those overnights.38  
In a final case, the appellate court reversed a trial court decision after
determining that the mother had willfully remained underemployed for child
support purposes and that the father’s income had not been properly calculated.39
The appellate court determined that it was improper for the trial court to use the
mother’s gross income, rather than using the mother’s potential income, in its
child support calculations.40 The appellate court also found that the trial court had
failed to include the father’s dependable overtime in its support calculations.41
V. PATERNITY & ADOPTION
Numerous paternity and adoption cases were decided during the survey
period. In one such paternity matter, the father had voluntarily signed two
paternity affidavits—one for a 3 year-old that he knew was not biologically his
child and one for a newborn that he suspected was not his biological child.42
Seven years later, after the mother sought child support, the father moved to set
aside a judgment of paternity for the older child and requested a DNA test for the
younger child.43 However, he had voluntarily signed the affidavits, both children
only knew him as their father, and he had not requested DNA testing until the
32. McKibben v. Kaiser, 106 N.E.3d 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
33. Id. at 530.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 531.
36. Perez v. Mounce, 110 N.E.3d 404, 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
37. Id. at 406.
38. Id. at 408.
39. Marshall v. Marshall, 92 N.E.3d 1112, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
40. Id. at 1118.
41. Id. at 1121.
42. In re Paternity of B.M., 93 N.E.3d 1132, 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
43. Id.
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child support case.44 Based on these circumstances, both the trial court and the
appellate court rejected his claim that the paternity affidavits should be set aside
on the ground of fraud, duress, or material mistake.45
In another paternity case, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding
that, as a matter of law, a child’s legal father had the right of visitation with the
child because he had signed a paternity affidavit.46 The appellate court noted that
while the time to rescind the paternity affidavit had long passed, as had the time
for the biological father to seek out a paternity affidavit, the trial court should
have allowed the mother to amend her paternity case, and it did not consider if the
biological father provided earlier support to the child.47 The appellate court
remanded, with instructions that the trial court consider these additional issues.48
In an adoption case, the Indiana appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
decision that the father had irrevocably implied consent to adoption by not
registering as a putative father within the timeframe permitted by Indiana
statute.49 The appellate court relied on the plain language of the statute in
reaching its decision.50
The appellate court also reversed a trial court’s holding that a parent must
contest an adoption by a written motion.51 The father had hired an attorney for a
CHINS case, who orally objected to the adoption at a hearing that consolidated
the CHINS, guardianship, and adoption proceedings.52 The father was
incarcerated and not present at the proceedings.53 The trial court’s holding was
based on its interpretation of the word “file” in Indiana’s adoption objection
statute, which states that a parent’s consent of an adoption is irrevocably implied
if the parent “fails to file a motion to contest adoption.”54 The appellate court
reversed and remanded on the grounds that the legislature did not require a
“written” objection.55 
In another case, the appellate court affirmed a trial court’s decision that a
mother’s consent for the adoption of her child was unnecessary when she was
deemed unfit.56 The trial court looked at several factors, including: 1) the
mother’s nine drug and alcohol parole violations in the year proceeding the
hearing, 2) her lack of seeing the child for more than two years prior to the
hearing, and 3) her failure to contribute financially to the child’s expenses for
44. Id. at 1134-35.
45. Id. at 1136.
46. Paternity of I.I.P. v. Rodgers, 92 N.E.3d 1158, 1159-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
47. Id. at 1164.
48. Id.
49. In re Adoption & Paternity of K.A.W., 99 N.E.3d 724, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
50. Id. at 727.
51. In re Adoption of J.R.O., 87 N.E.3d 37, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
52. Id. at 39.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 41-42.
55. Id. at 43.
56. J.H. v. S.S., 93 N.E.3d 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
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more than two years.57 The appellate court affirmed, noting that criminal history,
substance abuse, and mental health were several of the contributing factors
determining whether a parent is deemed unfit.58
In a failed adoption case, the appellate court reversed a trial court’s decision
that a father’s consent to an adoption by the stepfather was unnecessary.59 The
trial court based its decision on the father’s failure to pay child support during
several periods in the preceding couple of years and his failure to communicate
significantly with the child.60 The appellate court disagreed, noting that it was the
stepfather’s burden to show that the father had knowingly failed to pay child
support when able to do so and that the stepfather had provided no such
evidence.61 The appellate court also noted that the mother had limited, and then
prevented entirely, the father’s communication with the child.62
VI. CHINS AND THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The number of CHINS cases in Indiana remained unabated for yet another
year. In one CHINS case, the appellate court found that neither a mother’s
marijuana issue, nor an incident of domestic violence, sufficed to find the
children were CHINS.63 The domestic violence in this case took place between
the mother and father when they thought the children were asleep.64 The mother
subsequently filed a protective order against the father and moved the children
out of the home in which he was living.65 The appellate court found that the high
standard to adjudicate the children as CHINS was not met because the mother did
file for a protective order, even though not immediately, and there was no
evidence that the violence was ongoing or repeated.66  The appellate court also
noted that the mother’s marijuana use alone did not sufficiently meet the
requirement that a child must be “seriously endangered” to be a CHINS.67
In another case, an infant was removed from a mother’s care at birth and was
later found to be a CHINS after testing positive for the drug
Tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) at birth and upon evidence that the mother was
living with a known drug dealer.68 The mother appealed, noting that in the
intervening months between the removal and the finding that the child was a
CHINS, the mother moved into safe housing, found a job, had positive weekly
57. Id. at 1139.
58. Id. at 1140.
59. In re Adoption of E.M.L., 103 N.E.3d 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
60. Id. at 1115.
61. Id. at 1116.
62. Id. at 1118.
63. Ad.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 103 N.E.3d 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
64. Id. at 711.
65. Id. at 712.
66. Id. at 714.
67. Id. at 713.
68. In re B.V., 110 N.E.3d 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
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visits with child, and had regular negative drug screens.69 In reviewing the
evidence supporting the trial court’s decision, the appellate court must “apply the
two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the
findings support the judgment.”70 Finding that there was no evidence that the
mother had difficulty in meeting the child’s needs or that the child had unmet
needs, the appellate court reversed.71
The Indiana Court of Appeals also underscored that a child cannot be
adjudicated a CHINS when there is no indication that any needs are unmet or that
the child is any particular danger.72 In one case, the Indiana Department of Child
Services (“DCS”) merely stated that the mother was not affectionate with the
child and appeared to have a mental health issue.73 Noting that every endangered
child is not a CHINS case, and that no evidence had been submitted showing that
the child was in any danger from the mother’s mental illness or lack of affection,
the court dismissed the case.74
In another case, a CHINS petition initially arose after the mother shot the
putative father while the child was in the home.75 During the course of the
proceedings, it was discovered that the putative father was not the biological
father.76 The biological father then established paternity and took over care of the
child.77 The court nevertheless found the child to be a CHINS, before later
granting the father physical and legal custody of the child.78 Although this change
of custody may have mooted the appeal of the CHINS adjudication, the appellate
court reached a decision on the merits because of the role of a CHINS
adjudication in jeopardizing future family stability.79 
One successful parental rights termination case pitted court-appointed special
advocates (“CASA”), supporting termination, against DCS, which opposed it.80
At issue was whether a CASA had statutory authority to petition for the
termination of parental rights of a CHINS child when DCS opposed the
termination.81 The appellate court affirmed that a CASA could do so given his or
her role to protect the best interests of a child alleged to be a CHINS.82
Finally, an Indiana appellate court overturned a trial court’s decision to
terminate an incarcerated father’s parental rights after denying him a
69. Id. at 438.
70. Id. at 440.
71. Id. at 441.
72. See In re E.Y., 93 N.E.3d 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
73. Id. at 1146. 
74. Id. at 1148. 
75. In re S.C., 96 N.E.3d 579, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
76. Id. at 581.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 584.
80. Z.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
81. Id. at 898.
82. Id. at 899.
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continuance.83 In this case, the father was likely to receive a sentence
modification for finishing an intensive outpatient drug program.84 Although the
child was with a foster family that would adopt her if the father’s parental rights
were terminated, the father had never missed one of his court-permitted visits and
had a bond with the child.85 The appellate court found good cause for the father’s
motion for a continuance and remanded.86
VII. JURISDICTION & PROCEDURE
In one of the many jurisdiction and procedure cases that arose during the
survey period, an Indiana appellate court held that a CHINS petition must be
dismissed because a complete fact-finding hearing did not take place within 60
days of the filing of the petition.87 The appellate court found it insufficient that
the hearing began within 60 days because it was continued and not completed
until several months later.88
In another procedural matter, a mother alleged that she was denied due
process when DCS was allowed to file a successful second CHINS petition based
on “substantially similar allegations” that were found insufficient in the first
petition.89 The mother raised this potential res judicata matter after the second
hearing was completed,90 and the appellate court found that she waived the
claim.91
During the survey period, the Indiana Court of Appeals noted the “disturbing
trend” of motions to remand by DCS instead of briefs defending repeated,
significant violations of due process in termination of parental rights cases.92 In
In re J.K. and eight similar cases in 2018, DCS filed a motion to remand
proceedings rather than filing a responsive appellate brief after the parents alleged
due process violations.93 In In re J.K., the trial court entered a default judgment
83. In re A.S., 100 N.E.3d 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
84. Id. at 728.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 729.
87. In re J.R., 98 N.E.3d 652, 654 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
88. Id. at 653-54.
89. In re Eq.W., 106 N.E.3d 536, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
90. Id. at 540.
91. Id.
92. In re J.K., 110 N.E.3d 1164, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
93. Id. at 1165. See also In re S.T. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 48A02-1709-JT-2094
(Ind. Ct. App. 2018); In re T.Z. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 79A02-1710-JT-2406 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018); In re K.P. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 53A05-1712-JT-2830 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018); In re N.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 18A-JT-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); In re A.B. v.
Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 18A-JT-170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); In re C.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., No. 18A-JT-280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); In re J.F. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 18A-JT-
341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); In re L.R. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 18A-JT-529 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018).
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against a mother for simply missing a status of counsel hearing, thereby
terminating her parental rights.94 The mother filed a timely motion to correct
error, but at the hearing, she was denied the opportunity to explain her failure to
appear.95 In reversing the trail court, the appellate court admonished DCS “for its
failure to afford litigants throughout this state the due process rights they are
owed.”96 The court continued by reminding trial courts “of their duty to ensure
that litigants’ due process rights are not violated. Given the fundamental due
process rights at issue in termination of parental rights cases, affording litigants
these fundamental due process rights is essential, including not only the litigants
but also their children.”97
In another case, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that a judge need not
recuse himself in an adoption case despite having previously ruled against the
father and having listed opposing parties’ attorney as a professional reference for
an appointment to the Indiana Supreme Court.98 The Indiana Supreme Court
relied on the Indiana Trial Rules and noted that trial court judges were presumed
to “remain objective notwithstanding their having been exposed to information
which might tend to prejudice lay persons.”99 The unanimous court distinguished
this case from prior cases where a judge was running in a partisan election, and
the attorney was part of the campaign.100
An Indiana appellate court also reversed a trial court’s termination of parental
rights, holding that procedural difficulties in a CHINS case denied the parents due
process.101 During the CHINS case, five Family Case Managers (“FCMs”) from
DCS were involved in the matter, two of which were fired during the
investigation because of their inappropriate behavior in the case.102 DCS
conceded that the parents were denied due process, based partially on the number
of FCMs and also on the poor advice and actions of several of the FCMs.103 The
appellate court agreed that the CHINS proceeding had “unusual and alarming
circumstances” that required a remand to the trial court with reinstatement of
parental rights and re-opening of the CHINS case.104 
Regarding jurisdictional matters, an Indiana appellate court upheld a trial
court’s decision to decline its continued jurisdiction over a child custody case
initially filed in New Jersey.105 The parties had moved to Indiana from New
Jersey for two years with the children, during which the Indiana courts gained
94. In re J.K., 110 N.E.3d. at 1165.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1167.
97. Id.
98. L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069 (Ind. 2018).
99. Id. at 1073.
100. Id. at 1072.
101. In re C.M.S.T., 111 N.E.3d 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
102. Id. at 212.
103. Id. at 212-13.
104. Id. at 213.
105. Wilkinson v. Assante, 107 N.E.3d 1074, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
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exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over any custody dispute.106 However, after
the mother returned to New Jersey with the minor children,107 the father filed in
Indiana a motion for custody.108 The Indiana trial court dismissed it because New
Jersey was “the most appropriate and most convenient forum to determine the
best interest of the children as it is now the state with the closest connections to
the children and their family.”109 The appellate court affirmed, noting that a state
retains jurisdiction over a family law matter so long as a significant connection
remains between the state and the controversy.110
In another matter, during the original custody proceedings in Indiana, the
mother and child relocated to California.111 A custody dispute subsequently arose
and the mother successfully filed for a restraining order in a California court,
while the father subsequently filed a custody matter in Indiana.112 The trial court
denied the mother’s motion to transfer jurisdiction of the custody matter from
Indiana because a “significant connection” between the controversy and Indiana
remained if the father still resided there.113 The appellate court reversed, noting
that the trial court had abused its discretion in exercising jurisdiction because it
failed to consider whether domestic violence had occurred and the distance
between Indiana and the court that would get jurisdiction.114
In sum, Indiana appellate courts resolved a wide range of family law cases
during the survey period of October 1, 2017 to September 30, 2018, ranging from
property division to adoption. The courts continue to address the many issues
facing families today, providing guidance in the field.
106. Id. at 1078-79.
107. Id. at 1078. 
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1077.
110. Id. at 1079-80.
111. In re Paternity of J.G.L., 107 N.E.3d 1086, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
112. Id. at 1087-88.
113. Id. at 1090.
114. Id. at 1092.
